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1  | INTRODUC TION
The predictive validity evidence on situational judgment tests (SJTs) 
in personnel selection stimulated the introduction of SJTs in educa‐
tional selection settings. SJTs instruct individuals to judge the ap‐
propriateness of potential response options to challenging situations 
(Weekley & Ployhart, 2006). These dilemma‐like situations take 
place in the context of the organization or the educational program 
for which an individual applies. Generally, SJTs are used to measure 
noncognitive attributes. SJTs demonstrate sufficient criterion‐re‐
lated validity in personnel selection (McDaniel, Hartman, Whetzel, & 
Grubb, 2007) and educational admissions (Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 
2005a). Additionally, SJTs have incremental validity over traditional 
cognitive predictors such as high‐school grade point average (GPA) 
(Schmitt et al., 2009). Finally, SJT scores show smaller socioeconomic 
group differences than traditional predictors (Lievens, Patterson, 
Corstjens, Martin, & Nicholson, 2016).
Parallel to other noncognitive measures, concerns have been 
raised about faking on SJTs (Weekley & Ployhart, 2006). Faking is 
defined as conscious response distortion in order to make a favorable 
impression and to increase the chance of getting hired (Goffin & Boyd, 
2009). Concerns about faking on noncognitive measures are a con‐
sequence of the use of self‐report formats that are prone to faking.
1.1 | Faking on personality measures
Faking in high‐stakes selection settings has been extensively inves‐
tigated on personality measures. Considerable research has been 
devoted to answering the research questions “can people fake?” and 
“do people fake?” (Cook, 2016). Regarding the first question, stud‐
ies that instructed respondents to deliberately “fake good” dem‐
onstrated that most people can increase their personality scores 
(McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Regarding 
the second question, studies comparing the personality test scores 
of incumbents and applicants found more desirable scores for ap‐
plicants, indicating that people do fake in high‐stakes settings 
(Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Rosse, 
Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). Both questions have been addressed 
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Abstract
We examined the occurrence of faking on a rating situational judgment test (SJT) by 
comparing SJT scores and response styles of the same individuals across two natu‐
rally occurring situations. An SJT for medical school selection was administered twice 
to the same group of applicants (N = 317) under low‐stakes (T1) and high‐stakes (T2) 
circumstances. The SJT was scored using three different methods that were differ‐
entially affected by response tendencies. Applicants used significantly more extreme 
responding on T2 than T1. Faking (higher SJT score on T2) was only observed for 
scoring methods that controlled for response tendencies. Scoring methods that do 
not control for response tendencies introduce systematic error into the SJT score, 
which may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the existence of faking.
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in between‐subjects and within‐subjects study designs. Between‐
subjects designs compare the personality scores of two groups that 
receive different instructions (e.g., fake or respond honestly) or are 
from distinct settings (e.g., applicant or incumbent), whereas within‐
subjects designs compare different instructions or settings within 
the same individual. The main advantage of within‐subjects over be‐
tween‐subjects designs is the possibility to control for existing group 
differences which may confound the score differences (Donovan, 
Dwight, & Schneider, 2014). A disadvantage of within‐subjects 
designs in real‐life settings is the difficulty to control for order ef‐
fects, because counterbalancing is often not feasible, and for other 
retest effects (e.g., caused by practice effects or less test anxiety). 
However, retest effects on noncognitive instruments are generally 
viewed as a result of faking (Landers, Sackett, & Tuzinski, 2011; Van 
Iddekinge & Arnold, 2017). Overall, selection settings drive individu‐
als to convey desirable impressions of themselves, but individuals 
may differ in their tendency to fake. These individual differences 
have been described in various models of applicant faking (Goffin & 
Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller‐Hanson, Heggestad, 
& Thornton, 2006; Roulin, Krings, & Binggeli, 2016).
1.2 | Consequences of faking
Although researchers reached considerable consensus with respect 
to peoples’ ability and willingness to fake, differing perspectives exist 
on the influence of faking on the construct and predictive validity of 
personality measures. One perspective considers the influence of fak‐
ing on the predictive validity of personality measures to be negligible, 
calling the concerns on social desirability in the use of personality 
tests a “red herring” (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). Other studies 
have indicated that faking does not affect the construct validity (Ones 
& Viswesvaran, 1998) or the factor structure of personality measures 
(Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007). Additionally, Ingold, Kleinmann, 
König, and Melchers (2015) demonstrated a positive relation between 
faking and job performance and thus proposed that faking should be 
viewed as socially adequate behavior. In contrast, the other perspec‐
tive regards faking as detrimental to the use of personality measures 
for selection purposes, because faking affects the rank order of the 
applicants and reduces the quality of hiring decisions (Donovan et al., 
2014; Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007). In addition, concerns 
have been raised about the adverse effect of faking on the construct 
validity (Rosse et al., 1998) and criterion‐related validity (Morgeson et 
al., 2007; Mueller‐Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003) of person‐
ality test scores. So far, no consensus has been reached regarding the 
consequences of faking on personality measures.
1.3 | Measures against faking
Several studies investigated approaches to deal with faking on person‐
ality measures. First, warning respondents about the potential identifi‐
cation and consequences of faking resulted in lower personality scores 
than not warning respondents (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). However, 
warnings may also reduce the convergent validity of a personality 
measure (Robson, Jones, & Abraham, 2007). Second, faking has been 
tackled by correcting personality test scores for the score on a fak‐
ing measure (e.g., a social desirability scale) (Goffin & Christiansen, 
2003; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). The success of this approach is often 
limited due to the poor construct validity of faking measures, as the 
variance in faking measures is often not only explained by faking, but 
also by personality test scores and the criterion (Cook, 2016; Griffith 
& Peterson, 2008; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). Finally, another approach 
to reduce the influence of faking is the use of forced‐choice response 
formats, forcing respondents to choose between equally desirable re‐
sponses (Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000; O'Neill et al., 2017). 
A disadvantage of forced‐choice response formats is their ipsative 
nature which impedes the comparison of applicants, because the 
total score is equal for each applicant (Heggestad, Morrison, Reeve, 
& McCloy, 2006). However, one can perform interindividual compari‐
sons through partially ipsative measurement using scoring formats 
that allow total score variability (Heggestad et al., 2006). To summa‐
rize, research on the effectiveness of various approaches to deal with 
faking on personality measures has mixed results.
1.4 | Faking on SJTs
Unlike the extended research on faking on personality tests, the num‐
ber of published studies on faking on SJTs is limited (Table 1). As with 
personality tests, lab studies showed that individuals are able to obtain 
higher SJT scores if they are instructed to fake (Lievens & Peeters, 
2008; Nguyen, Biderman, & McDaniel, 2005; Oostrom, Köbis, Ronay, 
& Cremers, 2017; Peeters & Lievens, 2005). The size of the faking 
effects seems to depend on the order in which the fake and honest 
conditions are presented to the respondent. On a would‐do SJT (i.e., 
which asks respondents what they would actually do), Nguyen et al. 
(2005) found a larger effect size when respondents received the in‐
structions to respond honestly first (d = 0.34) than when respondents 
received the faking instructions first (d = 0.15). In contrast, Oostrom et 
al. (2017) found a larger faking on a would‐do SJT when faking instruc‐
tions preceded honest instructions (d = 1.09) than vice versa (d = 0.82). 
A faking effect on a should‐do SJT (i.e., which asks respondents what 
they should do) was only found in the fake‐first condition (d = 0.45), 
whereas the reverse (i.e., higher SJT scores under honest instructions 
than under faking instructions) was found in the honest‐first condi‐
tion (d	=	−0.34)	(Nguyen	et	al.,	2005).	Oostrom	et	al.	(2017)	found	a	
faking effect in both conditions, but the effect size was much smaller 
in the honest‐first condition (d = 0.11) than in the fake‐first condition 
(d = 1.31). Field studies comparing existing groups of applicants and 
nonapplicants showed mixed results, with one study reporting better 
SJT performance for applicants (Ployhart, Weekley, Holtz, & Kemp, 
2003) and another study reporting better SJT performance for nonap‐
plicants (Weekley, Ployhart, & Harold, 2004).
Several faking studies on SJTs attempted to reduce faking 
(Lievens & Peeters, 2008; Oostrom et al., 2017). The most common 
approach is asking individuals what they should do (i.e., knowledge 
instructions) as opposed to asking individuals what they would actu‐
ally do (i.e., behavioral tendency instructions) (Nguyen et al., 2005). 
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Knowledge instructions may reduce the influence of faking because 
these instructions convert the SJT to a cognitively loaded knowl‐
edge test and knowledge is difficult to fake (McDaniel et al., 2007). 
Although promising, knowledge instructions might not fully solve 
the faking issue since SJTs are not traditional knowledge tests with 
clear‐cut right and wrong answers. In fact, the dilemma‐like nature 
of SJT items causes even experts to disagree on the effectiveness 
of a response option. In addition, the meta‐analysis of McDaniel 
et al. (2007) indicated that SJTs with knowledge instructions still 
have noncognitive correlates, although to a lesser extent than SJTs 
with behavioral tendency instructions. Moreover, the differences 
between both types of response instructions are not replicated in 
high‐stakes settings, like a medical school selection setting (Lievens, 
Sackett, & Buyse, 2009). Finally, due to the higher susceptibility 
to faking, behavioral tendency instructions are of limited practical 
value in high‐stakes medical school selection and examining faking 
effects on SJTs using these instructions would, therefore, have little 
ecological validity.
1.5 | Present study
This study examined the fakability of an SJT in a medical school 
selection setting. Prior studies in the medical education domain in‐
dicated that applicants showed more response distortion on person‐
ality tests than nonapplicants (Anglim, Bozic, Little, & Lievens, 2018; 
Griffin & Wilson, 2012). The current study investigates whether ap‐
plicants also distort their responses to an SJT. Prior faking research 
on SJTs is extended in three different ways.
First, unlike the SJT studies mentioned in Table 1, this study 
used a within‐subjects design without different instructional sets 
(i.e., a field study). Although previous studies have used within‐sub‐
jects designs in the educational field to examine faking on person‐
ality measures (Griffin & Wilson, 2012; Niessen, Meijer, & Tendeiro, 
2017), this is one of the first field studies using a within‐subjects 
design to examine faking on an SJT. As mentioned above, the disad‐
vantage of between‐subjects designs is the complexity to determine 
if group differences are caused by faking or by existing individual 
differences (e.g., in job experience), especially in field studies where 
random assignment to applicant and nonapplicant groups is not 
possible. Within‐subjects designs control for these individual differ‐
ences. Additionally, lab studies examine whether applicants can fake, 
but not whether applicants actually do fake in real‐life high‐stakes 
selection settings. The present field study investigated the actual 
occurrence of faking by comparing the SJT scores of the same indi‐
viduals across two naturally occurring situations (i.e., low‐stakes and 
high‐stakes). Although the combination of a within‐subjects design 
and a field study will extend previous faking research on SJTs, the 
real‐life setting of the present study does not allow counterbalanc‐
ing the order of the low and high‐stakes settings. Earlier exposure 
to an identical or comparable test may cause retest effects (Lievens, 
Buyse, & Sackett, 2005b). Retest effects may reflect faking, but may, 
for example, also encompass practice effects, due to familiarization 
with the test format (Hooper, Cullen, & Sackett, 2006). The present 
study examined retest effects using a between‐subjects analysis 
comparing the SJT score of first‐time test takers to second‐time test 
takers (Lievens et al., 2005b).
Second, this study investigated differences in faking between 
desirable and undesirable response options because prior research 
proposed that there might be differences in the extent to which pos‐
itive traits are exaggerated and unflattering traits are de‐emphasized 
(Goffin & Boyd, 2009). A comparison of desirable and undesirable 
response options was also performed because previous research 
has indicated that SJT scores based on desirable items have lower 
construct and predictive validity than SJT scores based on unde‐
sirable items (De Leng, Stegers‐Jager, Born, & Themmen, 2018; 
Elliott, Stemler, Sternberg, Grigorenko, & Hoffman, 2011; Stemler, 
Aggarwal, & Nithyanand, 2016). Stronger validity for undesirable 
than desirable response options is possibly a result of larger consen‐
sus on what not to do than on what to do in challenging situations 
(Stemler et al., 2016). A survey regarding faking behaviors during 
job applications revealed that the proportion of respondents indi‐
cating to de‐emphasize negative traits was larger than the propor‐
tion of respondents indicating to exaggerate positive characteristics 
(Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003). Accordingly, we hypothesized 
the following:
Hypothesis 1 The influence of faking on SJT scores will be more 
pronounced for undesirable than for desirable response options.
Third, the present study examined faking on an SJT that uses 
a rating format as opposed to a pick‐one or pick‐two format (e.g., 
most and least likely to perform). To our knowledge, no prior faking 
studies have been published on a rating SJT (Table 1). A rating SJT 
enables the investigation of faking not only by examining differences 
in mean scores but also in extreme responding on the rating scale. 
Since prior research demonstrated a positive relationship between 
faking and extreme responding (Van Hooft & Born, 2012), we for‐
mulated the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a Applicant use more extreme responding in a 
high‐stakes than in a low‐stakes setting.
Whether differences in extreme responding relate to differences 
in the SJT score is likely to depend on the method used for scoring 
the SJT. Of the many SJT scoring methods that exist (De Leng et 
al., 2017), most use consensus judgment to determine the scoring 
key (McDaniel, Psotka, Legree, Yost, & Weekley, 2011) and calculate 
the distance on the rating scale between an individual's judgment 
and the consensus judgment. Prior research has demonstrated that 
these scoring methods may be affected by response tendencies 
(e.g., extreme response style), introducing a source of systematic 
error, which may decrease the criterion‐related validity of an SJT 
(McDaniel et al., 2011; Weng, Yang, Lievens, & McDaniel, 2018). In 
the present study, we examined how faking (i.e., higher SJT score in 
a high‐stakes setting than in a low‐stakes setting) is influenced by 
three different scoring methods that are differentially affected by 
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response tendencies in the use of a rating scale. Based on previous 
findings, we formulated the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2b More extreme responding is related to a larger 
score difference between low‐stakes and high‐stakes settings for 
a scoring method that is more strongly affected by response ten‐
dencies (henceforth: a scoring method that does not control for 
response tendencies).
Finally, as an additional exploratory test, we examined whether 
a scoring method controlling for response tendencies had stronger 
construct validity than a scoring method not controlling for response 
tendencies (Weng et al., 2018). We expect that the systematic error 
introduced by response tendencies will lower the construct validity 
of scoring methods not controlling for response tendencies.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Context and procedure
This study was conducted at a Dutch medical school, where the se‐
lection was based on pre‐university GPA, extracurricular activities 
and three cognitive tests on mathematics, logical reasoning, and a 
video lecture. Three months before the selection testing day, ap‐
plicants had the opportunity to participate in a selection orientation 
day, where they received information about the selection procedure. 
Participation in the selection orientation day was voluntary and free 
of charge. The same SJT scenarios were administered twice—on 
the 2017 selection orientation day (T1) and on the 2017 selection 
testing day (T2) (interval: three months). On both occasions, the SJT 
was administered for research purposes only and participation was 
voluntary. However, the stakes were higher on T2 as the SJT was 
administered among the admission tests for which test performance 
did determine the selection outcome. Because the selection context 
was more obviously present on T2, it was expected that applicants 
would be more motivated to fake on T2. Applicants were informed 
that their answers would not influence the selection decision, be‐
cause ethical regulations precluded misleading the applicants about 
the true purpose of the SJT administration. Applicants were asked to 
sign an informed consent form before participation. The data in this 
study were processed confidentially.
2.2 | Participants
The T1 sample consisted of 362 applicants (73.5% females) and was 
on average 18.55 years old (SD = 2.38). The T2 sample consisted of 
591 applicants (69.5% females) and was on average 18.96 years old 
(SD = 2.25). In total, 317 applicants were present in both samples 
(74.4% females). On T2, the average age of this overlapping group 
was 18.75 years (SD = 2.46). On T1, the sample that only provided 
data on T1 (N = 45) was comparable to the sample that provided 
data on T1 and T2 with respect to age (t(360) = 0.56, p > 0.05) and 
gender (χ2(1) = 1.22, p > 0.05). On T2, the sample that provided data 
on T1 and T2 was significantly younger (t(589) = 2.43, p = 0.015, 
d = 0.20) and consisted of significantly more females (χ2(1) = 7.77, 
p = 0.005, φ = 0.11) than the sample that only provided data on T2 
(N = 274). The results of this study were based on the overlapping 
group (N = 317).
2.3 | Situational judgment test
The SJT was designed to measure integrity and was developed using 
a combination of critical incident interviews and two established 
theoretical models. The first model comprised the honesty‐humility 
dimension of the HEXACO personality inventory. Unlike the well‐
known Big Five personality dimensions, the HEXACO assumes six 
dimensions of personality: honesty‐humility, emotionality, extraver‐
sion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience 
(Lee & Ashton, 2004). The sixth factor, honesty‐humility, is defined 
as “sincere, fair and unassuming versus sly, greedy and pretentious” 
(Ashton & Lee, 2005, p. 1324) and is positively related to integrity 
(Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005). The desirable response options of 
the SJT were written based on three of the four facets of the hon‐
esty‐humility dimension (i.e., sincerity, fairness, and modesty). The 
fourth facet, greed avoidance, was not used because this facet was 
considered less relevant for medical school applicants. The second 
model comprised the cognitive distortions measured by the How 
I Think questionnaire (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996). Self‐serving cogni‐
tive distortions are inaccurate thinking styles that may lead to the 
violation of social norms (Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2008) and are, 
therefore, negatively related to integrity. The undesirable response 
options of the SJT were written based on the four categories of cog‐
nitive distortions (i.e., self‐centeredness, blaming others, minimiz‐
ing, and assuming the worst). See De Leng, Stegers‐Jager, Born and 
Themmen (2018) for an extensive description of the development of 
the integrity SJT. The construct validity of the SJT was demonstrated 
by the significant correlations with four external integrity‐related 
measures on honesty‐humility, cognitive distortions, counterpro‐
ductive academic behavior, and workplace deviance (De Leng et al., 
2018). On T1, the SJT consisted of 10 scenarios, each followed by 
four response options (two desirable and two undesirable) that had 
to be judged on a six‐point rating scale (1: very inappropriate—6: very 
appropriate). On T2, the same 10 SJT scenarios were administered 
plus 21 additional scenarios. Two example items of the integrity SJT 
can be found in Supporting Information 1. Supporting Information 2 
shows the intercorrelations between SJT scores and the other vari‐
ables collected during the selection procedure.
2.4 | Scoring methods
The SJT was scored using three methods that were differently af‐
fected by response tendencies in the use of a rating scale. First, the 
raw consensus scoring method calculated the absolute distance on 
the rating scale between an applicant's judgment and the average 
judgment of a group of subject matter experts (SMEs). The SMEs 
were residents in training to become general practitioners. The size 
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of the SME group ranged between 18 and 23. The characteristics of 
the SME sample were described in De Leng et al. (2018). Distances 
were summed across the response options to obtain a scale score. 
Scale scores based on raw consensus were reverse coded (i.e., sub‐
tracted from the maximum possible score), for higher scores to indi‐
cate better SJT performance. For raw consensus scoring methods, 
extreme responding generally relates to lower SJT scores because 
more extreme ratings result in larger deviations from the scoring 
key (Weng et al., 2018). Second, the standardized consensus scor‐
ing method calculated the absolute distance between the applicant's 
judgment and the average SMEs’ judgment, but first performed a 
within‐person z standardization such that each respondent has 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across the items 
(McDaniel et al., 2011). Like the raw consensus scoring method, 
distances were summed across the response options and the scale 
scores were reverse coded. Standardized consensus scoring meth‐
ods control for response tendencies and should, therefore, not be 
affected by extreme responding. Third, the dichotomous consensus 
scoring method divided the rating scale in half. Applicants received 
one point if their judgment was located on the same side of the rat‐
ing scale as the average judgment across the SMEs (McDaniel et al., 
2011). Otherwise, applicants received no points. The dichotomous 
consensus scoring method is not affected by response tendencies 
because it does not matter whether an applicant's judgment is lo‐
cated at the extremes or near the midpoint of the rating scale. The 
distribution of the SMEs’ judgments across the rating scales of the 
SJT items is presented as Supporting Information 3. Internal con‐
sistency reliability estimates for all scoring methods are reported 
in Table 2. The SJT scores based on all response options showed 
sufficient to good reliability and the SJT subscores based on only 
the desirable or undesirable response options showed poor to suf‐
ficient reliability. Caution in the interpretation of these estimates is 
warranted as research indicated that internal consistency may be an 
unsuitable reliability estimate due to the multidimensional nature of 
SJTs (Whetzel & McDaniel, 2009). The multidimensional nature was 
verified in a principal component analysis of the SJT, which revealed 
an uninformative component structure.
2.5 | Personality
The HEXACO simplified personality inventory (HEXACO‐SPI) (De 
Vries & Born, 2013) was administered online after the selection test‐
ing day (T2), but before applicants received the admission decision. 
The honesty‐humility dimension of the HEXACO‐SPI was used to 
examine the construct validity of the integrity SJT. The honesty‐
humility subscale consisted of 16 items (e.g., “I find it hard to lie”) 
which need to be judged on a five‐point rating scale (1: strongly dis‐
agree—5: strongly agree). The internal consistency reliability of the 
honesty‐humility subscale was sufficient (α = 0.74). Participation in 
the online administration of the HEXACO‐SPI was voluntary and did 
not affect the admission decision. Respondents were informed that 
their answers would not affect the admission decision and signed 
informed consent before participation. Among the applicants who 
provided SJT data on T1 and T2 (N = 317), 171 responded to the 
personality questionnaire. The responders were comparable to the 
nonresponders with regard to gender (X2(1) = 0.36, p = 0.551) and 
age (t(315)	=	−0.51,	p = 0.610). Responders had a significantly higher 
pu‐GPA than nonresponders (t(239)	=	−2.08,	p = 0.039, d = 0.27). 
Additionally, responders obtained a significantly higher standardized 
consensus score on T2 than nonresponders for all response options 
(t(315)	=	−3.21,	p = 0.002, d = 0.37), for desirable response options 
(t(315)	=	−2.79,	p = 0.006, d = 0.31) and for undesirable response 
TA B L E  2   Average raw, standardized, and dichotomous 
consensus SJT scores and average percentage of items judged with 
the extreme rating scale points on T1 and T2 based on all response 
options, the desirable response options and the undesirable 
response options
 αT1 T1 αT2 T2
Raw consensus
All response 
options
0.74 121.94 (7.14) 0.81 120.22 (7.32)
Desirable re‐
sponse options
0.52 61.74 (3.88) 0.70 61.39 (3.73)
Undesirable 
response 
options
0.65 60.20 (4.19) 0.73 58.63 (4.75)
Standardized consensus
All response 
options
0.81 84.31 (4.42) 0.83 85.33 (4.11)
Desirable re‐
sponse options
0.66 41.71 (2.55) 0.67 42.38 (2.13)
Undesirable 
response 
options
0.75 42.60 (2.46) 0.79 42.95 (2.53)
Dichotomous consensus
All response 
options
0.72 36.38 (2.98) 0.83 37.21 (2.93)
Desirable re‐
sponse options
0.42 17.62 (1.60) 0.66 18.37 (1.35)
Undesirable 
response 
options
0.72 18.76 (1.88) 0.81 18.84 (2.07)
% Extreme responding
All response 
options
 52.50 (21.17)  61.41 (25.26)
Desirable re‐
sponse options
 55.32 (21.53)  65.78 (25.12)
Undesirable 
response 
options
 49.78 (25.41)  57.12 (29.52)
Note: T1 = selection orientation day (low motivation‐to‐fake context), 
T2 = selection testing day (high motivation‐to‐fake context), αT1 = alpha 
coefficients on T1, αT2 = alpha coefficients on T2. Standard deviations 
between brackets. Bold numbers indicate significant T1–T2 difference.
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options (t(315)	=	−2.87,	p = 0.004, d = 0.32). Responders also ob‐
tained a significantly higher dichotomous consensus score on T2 than 
nonresponders for all response options (t(315)	=	−2.49,	p = 0.016, 
d = 0.28) and undesirable response options only (t(315)	 =	 −2.64,	
p = 0.010, d = 0.29), indicating that SJT score had a positive but weak 
association with the voluntary participation in the online administra‐
tion of a personality inventory. Responders and nonresponders did 
not significantly differ in the raw SJT scores, the standardized and 
dichotomous SJT scores on T1 and the dichotomous SJT score based 
on the desirable response options on T2.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Mean differences
The mean raw consensus SJT score was significantly lower (worse) 
on T2 than T1 (Table 2), t(316) = 3.82, p < 0.001, dRM = 0.23 (small 
effect). The effect size for repeated measures (dRM) was calculated 
using the method described by Morris and DeShon (2002). A compa‐
rable raw consensus SJT score was found for desirable response op‐
tions (t(316) = 1.41, p = 0.161, dRM = 0.11). For undesirable response 
options, respondents obtained a significantly lower score on T2 than 
T1, t(316) = 4.88, p < 0.001, dRM = 0.28 (small effect). On the con‐
trary, the mean standardized consensus SJT score was significantly 
higher (better) on T2 than T1 for all response options (t(316)	=	−4.45,	
p < 0.001, dRM	=	−0.25,	small	effect),	for	desirable	response	options	
(t(316)	=	−4.72,	p < 0.001, dRM	=	−0.27,	small	effect),	and	for	undesir‐
able response options (t(316)	=	−2.59,	p = 0.010, dRM	=	−0.15).	The	
T1–T2 difference in the dichotomous consensus SJT score was also 
significant, t(316)	=	−5.01,	p < 0.001, dRM	=	−0.28	(small	effect)	with	
a higher (better) SJT score on T2 than on T1. In addition, a signifi‐
cantly higher score on T2 than T1 was found for desirable response 
options (t(316)	 =	 −8.25,	 p < 0.001, dRM	 =	 −0.46,	 medium	 effect),	
but not for undesirable response options (t(316)	=	−0.73,	p = 0.469, 
dRM	=	−0.04).	Thus,	a	faking	effect	(i.e.,	higher	score	in	a	high‐stakes	
than in a low‐stakes setting) was detected for the standardized and 
dichotomous consensus scoring method, but not for the raw consen‐
sus scoring method. In contrast to Hypothesis 1, the faking effect on 
the standardized and dichotomous SJT scores was larger for desir‐
able response options than undesirable response options.
3.2 | Extreme responding
Extreme responding was measured by the percentage of extreme 
rating scale points (i.e., 1 or 6) from the total number of rating scale 
points. In line with Hypothesis 2a, the use of extreme rating scale 
points was significantly higher on T2 than T1, t(316)	=	−7.36,	p < 0.001, 
dRM	=	−0.46	(medium	effect;	Table	2).	A	significantly	higher	percent‐
age of extreme ratings was found for both desirable (t(316)	=	−8.10,	
p < 0.001, dRM	=	−0.50,	medium	effect)	and	undesirable	response	op‐
tions (t(316)	=	−5.24,	p < 0.001, dRM	=	−0.32,	small	effect).
For each item, we calculated the distance between an individ‐
ual's position on the rating scale and the outer rating scale point 
to compare the opportunity to fake for desirable and undesirable 
response options (Pelt, Van der Linden, & Born, 2017). For desir‐
able items, the distance was calculated from the rating scale point 
representing “very appropriate” (6). For undesirable items, the dis‐
tance was calculated from the rating scale point representing “very 
inappropriate” (1). The opportunity to fake for desirable (M = 16.72, 
SD = 9.32) and undesirable response options (M = 16.85, SD = 10.72) 
was comparable (t(316)	=	−0.25,	p = 0.804, dRM = 0.02). So, the dif‐
ference between desirable and undesirable response options in 
extreme responding was not explained by a difference in the oppor‐
tunity to fake.
3.3 | Association between mean differences and 
extreme responding
The association between the mean score differences and extreme 
responding was examined by correlating the T1–T2 difference in 
the percentage of extreme rating scale points (ERS difference) to 
the T1–T2 difference in SJT scores (Table 3). The raw consensus 
SJT score difference was significantly and negatively correlated to 
the ERS difference, indicating that an increase in extreme respond‐
ing was associated with a decrease in the SJT score. Significant 
negative correlations between the ERS difference and the raw 
consensus score difference were also found for the desirable and 
undesirable response options. Conversely, the standardized and 
dichotomous consensus SJT score differences were significantly 
and positively correlated to the ERS difference, indicating that an 
increase in extreme responding was associated with an increase in 
the SJT score. The absolute correlation between the ERS differ‐
ence and the score difference based on undesirable response op‐
tions was significantly larger for the raw than for the dichotomous 
TA B L E  3   Correlation between the T1–T2 difference in extreme 
responding and the T1–T2 difference in SJT scores for three scoring 
methods and for all, desirable and undesirable response options
 
Difference % extreme 
responding T1–T2
Raw consensus
All response options −0.47
Desirable response options −0.37
Undesirable response options −0.43
Standardized consensus
All response options 0.45
Desirable response options 0.37
Undesirable response options 0.37
Dichotomous consensus
All response options 0.38
Desirable response options 0.32
Undesirable response options 0.30
Note: T1 = selection orientation day (low motivation‐to‐fake context), 
T2 = selection testing day (high motivation‐to‐fake context). Bold coef‐
ficients indicate a significant correlation (p < 0.001, two‐tailed).
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consensus scoring method, t(316)	 =	 −2.50,	 p = 0.013. Williams’ 
test was used to test the difference between two dependent 
correlation coefficients (Steiger, 1980). No significant difference 
between raw and dichotomous consensus in the absolute corre‐
lation between the ERS difference and the score difference was 
found for the score based on all response options (t(316) = 1.72, 
p = 0.087) or on desirable response options (t(316) = 0.89, 
p = 0.370). Additionally, the correlation between the ERS differ‐
ence and the standardized consensus score difference was signifi‐
cantly stronger than the correlation between the ERS difference 
and the dichotomous consensus score difference for all response 
options (t(316) = 2.42, p = 0.016) and undesirable response options 
(t(316) = 2.03, p = 0.043), but not for desirable response options 
(t(316) = 1.42, p = 0.160). In addition, the correlation between the 
ERS difference and the raw consensus score difference was not 
significantly different from the correlation between the ERS dif‐
ference and the standardized consensus score difference for all 
response options (t(316) = 0.37, p = 0.710), desirable response op‐
tions (t(316)	=	−0.15,	p = 0.880), and undesirable response options 
(t(316) = 1.10, p = 0.270). Thus, more extreme responding on T2 
than T1 related to lower SJT scores when using the raw consen‐
sus scoring method and related to higher SJT scores when using 
the standardized and dichotomous consensus scoring method. In 
other words, a faking effect was only detected when using a scor‐
ing method that controls for response tendencies. A stronger in‐
fluence of extreme responding on the T1–T2 score difference for 
the raw consensus scoring method was solely found in comparison 
with the dichotomous consensus scoring method for the undesir‐
able response options, only partially confirming Hypothesis 2b.
3.4 | Construct validity
As expected, the correlation of the raw consensus SJT scores with 
honesty‐humility was smaller than the correlation of the standard‐
ized and dichotomous SJT scores with honesty‐humility (Table 4). 
However, the standardized consensus score based on all response 
options had a significant and positive correlation to honesty‐humil‐
ity on T1 (r = 0.17, p = 0.029) and T2 (r = 0.24, p = 0.001). For the 
dichotomous consensus scoring method, the overall SJT score was 
also significantly and positively correlated to honesty‐humility, but 
only on T2 (r = 0.25, p = 0.001). The SJT score based on undesirable 
response options correlated significantly and positively to honesty‐
humility on both T1 and T2 for the standardized consensus scoring 
method (rT1 = 0.22, pT1 = 0.004 and rT2 = 0.30, pT2 < 0.001) and for 
the dichotomous consensus scoring method (rT1 = 0.17, pT1 = 0.023 
and rT2 = 0.33, pT2 < 0.001). For the standardized and dichotomous 
consensus score based on desirable response options, no significant 
correlations to honesty‐humility were found on T1 or T2. Stronger 
construct validity for undesirable than desirable response options 
was in line with our expectations based on the previous research (De 
Leng et al., 2018; Elliott et al., 2011; Stemler et al., 2016).
3.5 | Retest effects
Finally, retest effects were investigated as an alternative or comple‐
mentary explanation for the T1–T2 differences because the real‐life 
setting of the present field study prevented counterbalancing the 
order of the low and high‐stakes settings. Possible retest effects were 
examined by comparing the T2 SJT score for repeat test takers (i.e., 
applicants who also participated on T1) and novel test takers (i.e., ap‐
plicants who did not participate on T1) (cf. Lievens et al., 2005b). For 
the raw consensus scoring method, repeat test takers did not signifi‐
cantly differ from novel test takers in the SJT score on T2 (Table 5). 
For the standardized consensus scoring method, a significant differ‐
ence was found for the overall SJT score (t(589)	=	−3.28,	p = 0.001, 
d = 0.27, small effect), desirable response options (t(589)	 =	 −2.98,	
p = 0.003, d = 0.24, small effect), and undesirable response options 
(t(589)	=	−2.93,	p = 0.004, d = 0.24, small effect), all in favor of repeat 
test takers. In addition, a significant difference favoring repeat test 
takers was found for the dichotomous consensus score based on all re‐
sponse options (t(589)	=	−3.23,	p = 0.001, d = 0.27, small effect), desir‐
able response options (t(589)	=	−2.87,	p = 0.004, d = 0.24, small effect), 
and undesirable response options (t(589)	=	−2.73,	p = 0.007, d = 0.23, 
small effect). Finally, repeat test takers used significantly more ex‐
treme rating scale points on T2 than novel test takers, t(589)	=	−2.44,	
p = 0.015, d	=	−0.20	(small	effect).	Prior	exposure	to	an	SJT	resulted	in	
 
Scoring method
Raw consensus
Standardized 
consensus
Dichotomous 
consensus
T1 All response options −0.01 0.17 0.13
Desirable response options 0.01 0.07 0.04
Undesirable response options −0.03 0.22 0.17
T2 All response options −0.12 0.24 0.25
Desirable response options −0.14 0.08 0.01
Undesirable response options −0.08 0.30 0.33
Note: T1 = selection orientation day (low motivation‐to‐fake context), T2 = selection testing day 
(high motivation‐to‐fake context). Bold coefficients indicate a significant correlation, two‐tailed, 
p < 0.05.
TA B L E  4   Correlation to honesty‐
humility for three scoring methods and 
for all, desirable and undesirable response 
options on T1 and T2
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no retest effects when using the raw consensus score and in small re‐
test effects when using the standardized and dichotomous consensus 
score. Thus, retest effects—faking or practice—were only detected for 
scoring methods that controlled for response tendencies.
The SPSS syntax for the above analyses can be found in 
Supporting Information 4.
4  | DISCUSSION
The present study describes a within‐subjects investigation of faking 
on an SJT in a real‐life setting. Additionally, in contrast to previous 
research, this study examined faking on an SJT that uses a rating re‐
sponse format, enabling the examination of faking through extreme 
responding. Applicants used more extreme rating scale points on the 
high‐stakes selection testing day than on the low‐stakes selection 
orientation day, indicating that applicants responded differently to 
the SJT during the second administration. More extreme respond‐
ing relates to a T1–T2 increase in the SJT score (i.e., a faking effect) 
for the scoring methods that controlled for response tendencies (i.e., 
standardized and dichotomous consensus). Conversely, for the raw 
consensus scoring method, more extreme responding relates to a 
lower SJT score. These results suggest that statements about the 
existence of a faking effect on a rating SJT depend on the method 
used for scoring the SJT. The nonsignificant correlation with hon‐
esty‐humility for the raw consensus scoring method may indicate 
that systematic error caused by response tendencies interferes with 
the construct validity of a traditionally scored SJT. In addition, our 
findings indicate that a raw consensus scoring method may obscure 
the presence of a faking effect. Finally, the faking effect seemed 
stronger for desirable response options than for undesirable re‐
sponse options.
4.1 | Faking
Because the standardized and dichotomous SJT scores were not af‐
fected by systematic error due to response tendencies, we will focus 
on these SJT scores in the discussion below. The higher SJT scores 
on T2 than T1 seems to demonstrate a small faking effect for the 
standardized (d	=	−0.25)	and	dichotomous	(d	=	−0.28)	scoring	meth‐
ods, indicating that on the same SJT, the same applicants obtained 
a higher score in a high‐stakes setting than in a low‐stakes setting. 
The effect size is smaller than most effect sizes reported in Table 1. 
Unfortunately, a direct comparison with these published effect sizes 
is problematic because none of the previous SJT faking studies used 
a within‐subjects design in the field (i.e., not using different instruc‐
tional sets). Consequently, dissimilar effect sizes are likely caused by 
differences in study design and study type. Between‐subjects de‐
signs may produce larger faking effects than within‐subjects designs 
if the compared groups also differ on other variables, for example, 
job experience (Ployhart et al., 2003; Vasilopoulos, Reilly, & Leaman, 
2000). Additionally, lab studies may generate larger effect sizes than 
field studies, because different instructional sets involve a stronger 
intervention (Birkeland et al., 2006). Another possible explanation 
for the smaller faking effect found in this study is that the integrity 
SJT used knowledge response instructions, whereas most previous 
SJT faking studies used behavioral tendency instructions. Two SJT 
faking studies that compared both response instructions (Nguyen et 
al., 2005; Oostrom et al., 2017) demonstrated that the faking effect 
is smaller for knowledge than for behavioral tendency instructions. 
McDaniel et al. (2007) describe SJTs with knowledge instructions 
as maximal performance tests and SJTs with behavioral tendency 
instructions as typical performance tests and argue that self‐reports 
of typical behavior are more susceptible to faking than self‐report 
predictors of knowledge. Our findings seem to support the lower 
susceptibility to faking of SJTs with knowledge instructions, but also 
indicate that knowledge instructions do not completely cancel out 
the faking effect, presumably because SJTs are not pure knowledge 
tests due to their noncognitive content.
4.2 | Desirable and undesirable response options
The T1–T2 increase in the SJT score based on desirable response 
options was significant for the standardized (d	=	−0.27)	and	dichoto‐
mous (d	=	−0.46)	scoring	method.	For	undesirable	response	options,	
only the T1–T2 increase in the standardized SJT score was signifi‐
cant (d	=	−0.15),	albeit	considerably	smaller	than	the	T1–T2 increase 
TA B L E  5   Average SJT scores and extreme responding on T2 for 
repeat test takers (participation on T1) and novel test takers (no 
participation on T1)
 
Repeat test takers 
(N = 317)
Novel test takers 
(N = 274)
Raw consensus score on T2
All response options 120.22 (7.32) 119.83 (8.54)
Desirable response 
options
61.39 (3.73) 61.06 (4.84)
Undesirable response 
options
58.83 (4.63) 58.77 (4.90)
Standardized consensus on T2
All response options 85.33 (4.11) 84.03 (5.50)
Desirable response 
options
42.38 (2.13) 41.76 (2.90)
Undesirable response 
options
42.95 (2.53) 42.27 (3.12)
Dichotomous consensus score on T2
All response options 37.21 (2.93) 36.29 (3.85)
Desirable response 
options
18.37 (1.35) 17.98 (1.88)
Undesirable response 
options
18.84 (2.07) 18.31 (2.57)
Extreme responding (%) 61.5 (25.3) 56.3 (25.7)
Note: T1 = selection orientation day (low motivation‐to‐fake context), 
T2 = selection testing day (high motivation‐to‐fake context). Standard 
deviations between brackets. Bold numbers indicate a significant 
difference.
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for desirable response options. Additionally, the T1–T2 increase in 
extreme responding was larger for desirable (d	=	−0.50)	than	unde‐
sirable items (d	=	−0.32).	A	possible	explanation	for	these	findings	
is that it might be harder to fake on items that require the identifica‐
tion of what not to do than the identification of what to do, possibly 
because the undesirable items have greater cognitive loading than 
the desirable items. Prior research indicated that there appears to 
be more consensus on what not to do than on what to do in a chal‐
lenging situation (Stemler et al., 2016). SJTs consisting of undesir‐
able items that are unambiguously ineffective could be viewed as 
measures of maximum performance, whereas SJTs consisting of de‐
sirable items—for which the appropriateness is more dependent on 
personal style and preference—could be viewed as measures of typi‐
cal behavior. Measures of typical behavior are assumed to be more 
prone to faking than measures of maximum performance (McDaniel 
et al., 2007). Future research is necessary to replicate our findings 
and to investigate the reasons of why faking might be more difficult 
on undesirable items.
A stronger faking effect for desirable response options was not 
in line with our expectations based on the survey of Donovan et al. 
(2003). A possible explanation for this inconsistent finding is that 
what respondents say they do (e.g., moderately exaggerating posi‐
tive traits) is not what they actually do when they are in a high‐stakes 
situation. In other words, it is probable that respondents fake—con‐
sciously or unconsciously—on a survey regarding faking behaviors. 
Social desirable responding consists of intentional faking and uncon‐
scious self‐deception (Paulhus & John, 1998). Desirable items are 
potentially more affected by self‐deception than undesirable items. 
An interesting avenue for future research is to unravel the influence 
of faking and self‐deception on de‐emphasizing negative traits and 
exaggerating positive traits. Additionally, an explanation for the 
stronger faking effects for desirable than undesirable response op‐
tions might be found in the self‐discrepancy theory (Higgins, Roney, 
Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). The self‐discrepancy theory describes that 
discrepancies between one's perceived actual self and one's desired 
self result in negative feelings (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). The 
desired self may be characterized by aspirations and wishes (i.e., the 
ideal self) or by obligations and responsibilities (i.e., the ought self). 
Individuals who are predominated by the ideal self are more oriented 
toward approaching a desired end state, whereas individuals who are 
predominated by the ought self are more oriented toward avoiding 
an undesired end state (Higgins et al., 1994). Applicants’ responses 
to the SJT might have been more strongly affected by the ideal self 
than the ought self, possibly caused by characteristics of the selec‐
tion context leading to self‐enhancement. To our knowledge, no pre‐
vious faking studies have referred to the self‐discrepancy theory, so 
more research is necessary to elucidate the influence of ideal and 
ought selves on faking positive and negative traits.
4.3 | Scoring methods
A rating SJT allowed us to examine faking through extreme respond‐
ing. Extreme responding is unaffected by the scoring method of the 
SJT, which is useful because our findings indicate that conclusions 
about faking heavily depend on how an SJT is scored. Extreme re‐
sponding occurred more often in a high‐stakes than in a low‐stakes 
setting, which is in line with previous faking research on personality 
measures (Levashina, Weekley, Roulin, & Hauck, 2014; Van Hooft 
& Born, 2012). For a traditional raw consensus scoring method, ex‐
treme responding is related to lower scores, because it creates more 
distance from the consensus judgment, which is often located near 
the midpoint of the rating scale (Weng et al., 2018). Consequently, 
one coaching strategy to improve the score on a rating SJT instructs 
respondents to avoid the extreme responses on the rating scale 
(Cullen, Sackett, & Lievens, 2006). Additionally, our results indicate 
that a raw consensus SJT score may have weaker construct valid‐
ity than a standardized or dichotomous SJT score, which is in line 
with previous research demonstrating lower criterion‐related valid‐
ity for scoring methods that do not control for response tendencies 
(McDaniel et al., 2011; Weng et al., 2018). Response tendencies in‐
troduce systematic error in a rating SJT score, which may result in 
lower construct and criterion‐related validity coefficients. In addi‐
tion, findings indicate that systematic error caused by response ten‐
dencies may lead to inaccurate conclusions about faking on an SJT.
Hypothesis 2b that scoring methods that do not control for 
response tendencies are more strongly affected by a change in 
extreme responding than scoring methods that do control for re‐
sponse tendencies is only confirmed for the dichotomous SJT score 
based on undesirable response options. Apparently, controlling for 
response tendencies within one test administration does not reduce 
the influence of a change in response tendencies across test admin‐
istrations. Additionally, an explanation for the significant influence 
of extreme responding on the dichotomous SJT score might be that, 
for 11 out of 40 response options, the consensus judgment was lo‐
cated near the midpoint of the rating scale (i.e., between 2.5 and 
4.5 on a 6‐point rating scale). For these ambiguous midrange items, 
an applicant might be close to but on the “incorrect” side of the rat‐
ing scale, yielding no points. More extreme responding in the high‐
stakes setting would shift the applicant's judgment to the “correct” 
half of the rating scale, producing a higher SJT score. Weng et al. 
(2018) showed that the dichotomous consensus scoring method is 
more appropriate for non‐midrange items, supporting this potential 
explanation.
A last notable finding was that—for the standardized and di‐
chotomous SJT score—the construct validity was stronger on T2 
than T1, possibly because applicants are familiarized with the SJT 
format on T2 which reduces construct‐irrelevant variance due to 
unfamiliarity with the test format (Lievens et al., 2005b). SJTs are 
relatively new in admission procedures to higher education and 
use a test format that is quite different from test formats used by 
traditional admission tests. Medical school admission committees 
should consider acquainting applicants with the SJT format before 
administering it for admission purposes. Another possible expla‐
nation for the stronger correlation with honesty‐humility on T2 
than T1 is that applicants have faked on the personality measure, 
which was administered after the selection testing day, but before 
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applicants received the admission decision. Applicants might have 
been motivated to fake on the personality measure, because ad‐
mission was not yet certain. The stronger construct validity on T2 
might, therefore, also be a result of overlapping variance caused 
by faking in both scores (i.e., SJT score on T2 and honesty‐humility 
score). Finally, the larger correlation with honesty‐humility on T2 
might be caused by the stronger common frame of reference pro‐
duced by the high‐stakes selection context (Ones & Viswesvaran, 
1998). Even though the stakes were lower on T1 than T2, some ap‐
plicants might still have felt a tendency to fake. In contrast, a high‐
stakes setting may present a stronger frame of reference that is 
shared by all applicants. Ones and Viswesvaran (1998) emphasize 
the importance of standardizing the test administration to gener‐
ate a common frame of reference and to enhance the reliability. 
This explanation is supported by higher estimates of internal con‐
sistency reliability for the SJT score on T2 than T1. More research 
is necessary to examine which of these processes give rise to the 
stronger construct validity on T2 than T1.
Overall, each scoring method has pros (e.g., raw consensus 
scores have more variance and dichotomous consensus scores have 
stronger construct validity) and cons (e.g., raw consensus scores rely 
on suboptimal difference scores and dichotomous consensus scores 
may neglect relevant variance), that must be taken into account 
when using SJTs in selection settings (see De Leng et al. (2017) for 
an overview).
4.4 | Faking versus retest effect
Due to the real‐life setting of this study, the order of the selection 
orientation day and selection testing day could not be counterbal‐
anced. We examined the possibility of a retest effect as an alter‐
native explanation by comparing the SJT scores of first‐time and 
second‐time test takers (cf. Lievens et al., 2005b). The significantly 
higher score for second‐time test takers (d = 0.27) provides evidence 
for a small retest effect when using the standardized or dichoto‐
mous consensus scoring method, which corresponds to previous 
research on retest effects on SJTs (Dunlop, Morrison, & Cordery, 
2011; Lievens et al., 2005b). Retest effects could represent faking, 
but could also represent a practice effect or actual improvement in 
the relevant construct (Hooper et al., 2006). The stronger construct 
validity on T2 than on T1 provides some support for a practice effect 
caused by familiarization with the SJT format. However, studies on 
retest effects involve multiple similar test administrations, whereas 
in the present study, the SJT is deliberately administered across two 
dissimilar test conditions. It is probable that the T1–T2 increase in 
the standardized and dichotomous SJT score is partially caused by 
both a faking and a practice effect. Future research is necessary to 
unravel the influence of faking and practice on score changes across 
low‐ and high‐stakes conditions, for example, by ensuring that ap‐
plicants are already familiar with the SJT format. Another possible 
method for disentangling the sources of the T1–T2 score change in‐
volves administering the SJT twice under the same conditions to es‐
tablish a baseline for the retest effect (Ellingson, Sackett, & Connelly, 
2007). Despite the problems with disentangling the causes of the 
T1–T2 score difference, our findings do indicate that retest effects—
faking or practice—are obscured when scoring a rating SJT with a 
method that does not control for response tendencies.
4.5 | Implications for future research and practice
First, we recommend future investigations of faking or retest ef‐
fects on rating SJTs to use scoring methods that control for response 
tendencies. Examples of other scoring methods that control for re‐
sponse tendencies are mode consensus or proportion consensus 
(Weng et al., 2018). Second, research on the consequences of fak‐
ing for the construct validity of personality measures should take 
into account the influence of response tendencies (i.e., extreme re‐
sponding) and scoring methods. Our findings indicate that response 
tendencies and scoring methods might be contributing factors to 
the mixed evidence concerning the influence of faking on the con‐
struct validity. Third, we advise researchers to make a distinction 
between desirable and undesirable response options as this may af‐
fect the conclusions on SJT faking. The distinction between desir‐
able and undesirable items can be based on empirical data (Stemler 
et al., 2016) or on a theoretical framework (De Leng et al., 2018). 
Practitioners of SJTs are also recommended to use scoring methods 
that control for response tendencies and undesirable response op‐
tions because these modifications may increase the construct and 
criterion‐related validity of the SJT.
4.6 | Limitations
This study is not without limitations. First, the main limitation of this 
study is the inability to rule out other possible sources of a retest ef‐
fect. A between‐subjects analysis comparing the SJT scores of novel 
and repeat test takers indicated a retest effect of similar size as the 
faking effect. The investigation of retest effects on noncognitive in‐
struments has primarily interpreted these effects as a result of appli‐
cant faking (Van Iddekinge & Arnold, 2017). However, retest effects 
may have many different causes, such as practice effects, genuine 
improvement in the construct, reduction in test anxiety, or test fa‐
miliarization (Lievens et al., 2005b; Van Iddekinge & Arnold, 2017). 
Even though the retest effect found in the current study is likely 
produced by faking as T1 and T2 were deliberately chosen to have 
substantial contextual differences, it is not feasible to exclude other 
potential sources of a retest effect. Future studies should use re‐
search designs that allow the separation of these different sources.
Second, the scoring methods used rely on the difference be‐
tween a respondent's rating and the average rating across a group 
of SMEs. Difference scores, however, have several limitations, such 
as low reliability, reduced effect sizes, and loss of information from 
the separate component scores (Edwards, 2001). The limitations of 
the raw consensus scoring method were confirmed in the present 
study as shown by obscured faking or retest effect and the weak 
construct validity. The standardized and dichotomous consensus 
scoring methods solved some of the problems of the raw consensus 
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scoring method. Nonetheless, future research is advised to examine 
polynomial regression methods as an alternative method for scoring 
SJTs, because these methods provide a more direct solution to the 
problems of difference scores (Edwards, 2001; Kulas, 2013).
Third, due to the real‐life setting of this study, we investigated 
faking using only one order of conditions: low‐stakes on T1 and 
high‐stakes on T2. Other within‐subjects studies on faking mainly 
use the reversed order, i.e., high‐stakes among applicants on the 
first occasion and low‐stakes among incumbents on the second 
occasion. We believe that the low‐stakes‐first order of the cur‐
rent study has some important benefits. First, because most T1 
respondents were also present on T2, it is unlikely that our find‐
ings are affected by a restriction of range. Second, because our 
T2 respondents were not medical school incumbents, it is unlikely 
that T1–T2 score differences are caused by experience at medical 
school. The within‐subjects field study by Ellingson et al. (2007) 
examined response distortion on a personality inventory using 
both orders and found a larger score change for the low‐stakes‐
first condition than for the high‐stakes‐first condition. In contrast, 
within‐subjects studies using directed‐faking instructions demon‐
strated a faking effect on a should‐do SJT for the fake‐first condi‐
tion, but not for the respond‐honestly‐first condition (Nguyen et 
al., 2005; Oostrom et al., 2017). A faking effect observed only in 
the fake‐first condition was explained by respondents’ tendency 
to respond deliberately different during the second condition after 
they responded to the best of their ability during the first condi‐
tion. The tendency to respond differently might be less strong in 
the current study because no directed faking instructions were 
used and due to the longer time period between both conditions 
than in the previous studies. Nonetheless, these contrasting find‐
ings require more research on the effect of the order of the low‐ 
and high‐stakes settings.
Fourth, during both test administrations, the SJT was adminis‐
tered for research purposes only, which might reduce the general‐
izability of our findings to real selection settings. However, Niessen 
et al. (2017) found large score differences on several noncogni‐
tive measures between a research and an admission context, even 
though applicants were informed that the noncognitive measures 
were not used for selection. Additionally, the difference in extreme 
responding indicated that the applicants responded differently on 
T2. The selection testing day, therefore, appears to be a sufficient 
proxy of a high‐stakes situation.
Finally, it might be too simplistic to assume that faking is limited 
to extreme responding (König, Merz, & Trauffer, 2012). Moreover, 
prior research has demonstrated that response styles differ across 
individuals (Ziegler, 2015) and cultures (He, Bartram, Inceoglu, & Van 
de Vijver, 2014). Further research is required to examine how other 
response styles apart from extreme responding relate to faking.
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